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Abstract
In this paper I study between and within country differences in attitudes towards 
democracy, focusing specifically on Muslim-majority countries and the degree to which 
college educated and high-income individuals in these countries conform to the expectations 
of modernization theory in their support for democracy. I find that support for democracy 
among high-income and college educated individuals is reduced in Muslim-majority 
countries relative to their peers around the world, but that this finding is due to an 
environment of political instability as well as levels of national income and democracy. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction
This paper explores the relationship between support for democracy in Muslim-
majority countries and individual education and income. Inglehart and Welzel's (2005) 
revised version of modernization theory suggests a progression to post-materialist values 
(including support for democracy) in all countries as they experience economic development. 
However, the literature on attitudes to democracy typically uses national averages rather than 
individual data. Further, there is little exploration of how the effects of education and income 
vary across countries. This paper is an attempt to fill those gaps through a multilevel analysis 
of how individual attitudes are shaped by education and income, with a particular focus on 
the systematic variations that are the result of differences in national context.
The fourth wave of the World Values Survey (WVS) has taught us a lot about 
political culture in Muslim-majority countries (MMCs), most notably that Muslims are no 
less supportive of democracy than anyone else (Inglehart and Norris 2003). At the national 
level there is very little variation in aggregate political attitudes between Muslims and others 
to be found, but this study focuses on differences among wealthy and college educated 
individuals across countries – a relatively unexplored area to date. These individuals are 
worth looking at because they are a crucial factor in modernization theory; more education 
and increased standards of living resulting from economic development are supposed to 
produce increased tolerance (Lipset (1963), Inglehart and Welzel (2005)) and thus a more 
democratic civic culture (Almond and Verba 1963). This study looks directly at support for 
democracy as its outcome, and specifically seeks to explain how education (and to a lesser 
extent wealth) influence support for democracy in MMCs. If individual wealth and education 
do not promote support for democracy in MMCs, then that would pose a problem for 
modernization theory and its claims to universal validity. 
Figure 1. Difference in mean support for democracy for college educated vs. less than 
college educated individuals1
The vertical axis in figure 1 represents the percentage increase in support for democracy 
associated with being college educated.2 Support for democracy is measured by the WVS 
question asking respondents if they agree with the statement “Democracy may have problems 
1 The sample used for this figure and all tables and analyses in this paper is 73731 individuals in 64 countries 
take from the WVS. Details are given in the Data section. The list of countries can be found at Appendix A. 
2 The vertical scale is the average level of support for democracy among people with at least some college 
education in a country minus the average level of support for democracy among those with a high school 
diploma or less. For the purposes of figure 1 and table 1 the results are collapsed into two categories of 
Agree or Disagree. This question in the WVS is described in the data section as the variable 'prodem.'
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but it's better than any other form of government.” MMCs are mostly to the left of the scale3, 
suggesting that any pro-democracy effect resulting from college education is reduced in 
MMCs. The basic empirical question to be investigated in this paper is posed by the presence 
of all ten of the MMCs in the WVS on the left half of figure 2: why does college education 
have less positive association with support for democracy in MMCs as compared to other 
countries? 
As a preliminary step to the more complicated models, I present some comparisons of 
means below which compare subgroups of the rich and college educated across MMCs and 
non-MMCs, richer and poorer countries (OECD, non-OECD) and democracies and non-
democracies4. 
Table 1: Percentage Support for Democracy by Income and College Education across 
Country Types
Population 
Subgroup 
(n=73731)
Country type (n=64)
MMC 
(n=10)
non-MMC
(n=54)
OECD 
(n=26)
non-OECD
(n=38)
Democracy 
(n=48)
Non-
democracy
(n=18)
Less than college, 
not rich 88.6% 84.6% 88.6% 83.1% 86.4% 83.2%
College, not rich 87.2% 89.1% 94.3% 84.1% 91.1% 82.5%
Less than college, 
rich 89.9% 87.3% 90.7% 86.1% 89.0% 84.8%
College, rich 89.4% 92.1% 95.7% 88.2% 93.9% 83.4%
By reading down a column one sees the extent to which education and income are positively 
correlated with increased support for democracy within a country type. In MMCs, individuals 
3 The first 12 countries in ascending order from left to right are Nigeria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Uruguay, 
Philippines, Morocco, Algeria, China, Spain, Uganda, Greece, and Jordan. The highest score is Russia's.
4 Classification as a democracy is done using data from the Polity IV dataset (see data section), with a score 
of 6 or more qualifying a country as a democracy. 
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with some college education have lower levels of support for democracy among the poor and 
the rich (although the difference is not significant at the p=0.05 level for the rich). The 
pattern is the opposite in non-MMCs, OECD countries and democracies, where the 
individuals with college education have mean levels of support for democracy that are 4-5 
percentage points higher than individuals with less than a college education (all statistically 
significant at the p=0.05 level). As most MMCs are poor countries (only 1 of the 10 in this 
sample is an OECD member – Turkey), and only a few are considered democracies (3 of the 
10), the degree to which these broader groupings reflect the pattern seen in MMCs should 
shed some light on whether college education has unique correlations in MMCs or is part of a 
broader pattern. In the non-OECD countries, college educated individuals have 1-2% higher 
mean support for democracy (statistically significant at the p=0.05 level), which is more than 
in MMCs but less than in the wealthy OECD countries. In non-democracies, college 
education is associated with even stronger reductions (mean differences are statistically 
significant at the p=0.05 level) in support for democracy than was the case for MMCs. That 
the pro-democracy effects of college education are reduced in poorer countries and reversed 
in non-democracies suggests that the finding for MMCs may be in part due to national level 
income and political regime type. The object of the detailed analysis in this paper will be to 
try and explain these empirical findings in greater detail and with more methodological rigor 
via a set of theoretically motivated hypotheses linking national context to individual level 
attitudes towards democracy.
This paper explores the relationship between support for democracy in Muslim-
majority countries and individual education and wealth. Inglehart and Welzel's (2005) 
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revised version of modernization theory suggests a progression to post-materialist values in 
all countries as they experience economic development. The key mechanism is one of 
individual attitudinal change, but a gap in the literature is the exploration of how the way in 
which individual attitudes are shaped by education and wealth varies across countries. I first 
establish the theoretical background for this paper based on modernization theory and then 
look to what the literature on political attitudes in MMCs can offer to guide this study.
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Chapter 2. What does theory tell us about the expected relationship between attitudes 
to democracy and individual wealth and education? 
Inglehart and Welzel's (2005) update to modernization theory links attitudinal 
orientations, and particularly the potential for democracy, to social change driven by 
modernization and industrialization. They identify cognition and experience as driving forces 
of attitudinal change. A cognitive shift towards rationality is the product of education, 
particularly higher education (often the domain of the privileged), and a changing social 
environment which becomes less harsh as a result of economic development and long term 
stability. Modernization theory also argues that individual attitudinal change drives political 
change, and specifically that democratization of national regimes follows from the cognitive 
shift towards rationality and the increased existential security resulting from economic 
development. I focus on the first causal sequence of attitudinal change favoring democracy 
and do not address any implications for regime type. The literature on transitions to 
democracy does not generally support political culture (understood in the Almond and Verba 
(1963) sense of a set of political attitudes and norms) as a source of that transition.5 
5 Tilly (1998) describes the expansion of citizenship (in terms of participation in national politics) as the result 
of “continuous struggle” rather than “gradual enlightenment.” That participatory citizenship results is 
inadvertent, as the motivation for individual action that he draws on is self-interest rather than ideological 
commitment to democracy. In a similar vein, Waterbury (1994) draws on Dankwart Rustow (1970) and 
Przeworski (1991) to argue that democracy is a second-best solution to “intractable conflicts of interest ... 
flow[ing] from bargains arrived at by parties with no experience and little philosophical commitment to 
Moreover, the first step (attitudinal change) in this causal sequence is a necessary 
precondition and thus worth examining in its own right. I look in turn at how education and 
wealth influence individual attitudes and then look at the role of existential security.
A central argument in Inglehart and Welzel's (2005) restatement of modernization 
theory is based on Maslow's hierarchy of needs. They argue that “... increasingly favorable 
existential conditions lead people to place greater emphasis on human freedom and choice” 
(134), where existential conditions chiefly means economic development and physical 
security. Education (occurring as part of economic development) plays a key role here 
because it is through the inculcation of scientific rationality that people leave traditional 
worldviews, and “there is a universal tendency for higher education to encourage people to 
place more emphasis on self-expression values” (37). Inglehart and Welzel (2005) use 
college education as a proxy for elite status and find that it is associated with increased 
emphasis on self-expression values vis-à-vis the less educated in almost every country, 
although they do not control for income in doing so. As support for democracy is positively 
correlated with self-expression (r=0.45), we can expect that education does increase support 
for democracy. However, including income separately for each individual will allow a more 
granular analysis of the effects of education. 
Hypothesis: Individual education and income lead to increased support for democracy
Lipset's (1963) formulation of classic modernization theory had the same essential 
democracy.” Unlike the literature on transitions to democracy, the consolidation of democracy has a strong 
role for political culture. Linz and Stepan's (1996:16) definition of consolidation requires democracy to be 
“routinized and deeply internalized in social, institutional and even psychological life, as well as in political 
calculations for achieving success.”
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mechanism at heart  - that of cultural change through economic development. At the 
individual level, education is a necessary if not sufficient condition for creating a democratic 
citizen who is tolerant and makes rational political decisions (39-40). A distinction should be 
drawn here between intellectuals (who are the subject of their own sociological literature, see 
Kurzman and Owen (2002)) and merely having at least some college education. We needn’t 
pin ourselves down to a specific definition of intellectual to recognize that the cultural capital 
associated with intellectuals is far greater than what we would associate with college 
graduates in general. As such, the leading role of intellectuals in democratizing movements 
(in the early twentieth century for example, see Kurzman and Leahey(2004)) can be kept 
distinct from the influence of college education on support for democracy.  
Lipset associates attitudes with class membership, conflating education and income 
somewhat. The lower classes, being poorer and less educated, are intolerant and more attuned 
to authoritarianism (citing Adorno et al 1950 and Stouffer 1955). However, Lipset also 
recognizes some role for class conflict in shaping attitudes towards democracy, particularly 
in a poorer country where the sharp difference in standards of living between the top and the 
bottom lead to it being “psychologically necessary” for the upper class to treat the lower as 
“vulgar” and “innately inferior,” and to whom it would be “absurd” and “immoral” to grant 
political rights (51). 
Although Lipset doesn't substantiate the idea of psychological necessity underlying 
upper class attitudes, we can find ample support for how class differences shape how those in 
positions of privilege view the extension of political rights to the less privileged. From 
conflict theory (whether Marxist influenced or not) we can take struggle over resources as a 
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primary motivation of class relations. In this perspective, individual interests suffice for 
motivation to resist change for those in positions of privilege. If democracy entails increasing 
political access and participation for the disadvantaged and is thus a potential threat to the 
status quo, it would then follow that the privileged might be less supportive of it. 
The idea that the privileged could oppose democracy out of a desire to preserve their 
position should be strengthened when the stakes at risk are higher. Social safety nets and 
economic opportunity generally are less available in poorer countries and those with greater 
income inequality. Education and wealth are more clearly markers of privilege in poorer and 
more unequal countries, and the privileged (i.e. wealthy and educated) will seek to avoid the 
change entailed in support for democracy so as to preserve their positions of privilege. 
Collins (1979) makes a similar argument with reference to the USA when he talks about 
education as a form of credentialing which serves to reproduce existing class structures. 
Similarly, Bourdieu and Passeron (1990) make the argument that class advantages are passed 
on to subsequent generations through the education system.
Hypothesis:  Support for democracy among the college educated and rich will be reduced in 
countries where there is greater inequality
A complication with this hypothesis lies in whether democracy is treated normatively 
or instrumentally by respondents. Huang (2005) argues that support for democracy by 
Muslims in the WVS is more of a romanticized and normative statement rather than an 
conscious embrace of the substance of western liberal democracy. The wording of the 
question I use (“Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of 
government”) is more abstract than concrete (Rose et al (1998) have a similar discussion for 
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eurobarometer questions). However, the nearly blanket support for democracy expressed in 
almost every country suggests that the question is tapping into a global norm rather than a 
reflection of democratic regimes in the different countries. The diffusion of a global norm of 
democracy is documented in Eastern and Central Europe (Rose et al 1998) and throughout 
the world (Norris and Inglehart 2003, Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003). The literature 
supports the view that the support for democracy demonstrated around the world has a strong 
normative component.
The above hypothesis can be seen as consistent with the normative treatment of 
support for democracy by drawing further on Bourdieu (1977). If democracy is a challenge to 
the status quo, then a normative resistance to democracy is consistent with the perpetuation 
of a given set of relations that benefit the dominant group and legitimate its dominance. The 
preservation of an existing field of power which serves the interests of the few would 
generate its own normative imperatives in opposition to the spread of global norms. 
Moreover, we should not expect the effects of education to be the same all over the 
world. If we treat education as a marker of status attainment (Blau and Duncan (1967)) and 
look to class membership for its impact on political attitudes (Lipset (1963)), education 
becomes a proxy for class attitudes which may be reinforced when class differences are 
starker. However, the shift from class-based politics to culture-based politics through the 
“new social movements” is a feature of advanced capitalism in the global North (Hechter 
(2004) draws on Castells (1997) and Habermas (1987) among others in discussing the rise of 
cultural politics). Hechter's solidaristic theory explaining the shift from class to cultural 
politics is “limited to advanced capitalist economies with freedom of association” (437) 
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suggesting that the class based politics interpretation may only be valid in the global south.
Hypothesis: Higher national income will lead to increased support for democracy among the 
college educated and the rich
It will also be probable that the current regime type will have an impact on support for 
democracy among the privileged in poorer and more unequal countries. Obviously, the 
hypothesis that resistance to democracy out of a desire to preserve one's advantages in the 
status quo is less grounded if the status quo is democracy, but this is typically not the case in 
the MMCs which are the focus of this paper. Nonetheless, I will include current regime type 
as one of the variables describing the national level context of my analysis.
Hypothesis: There will be greater support for democracy among the college educated and 
the rich in more democratic countries
Inglehart and Welzel (2005) recognize that modernization is not linear. Setbacks and 
discontinuities in a country's development trajectory create instability, and that instability at 
the national level will affect individual attitudes by bringing survival values back into 
prominence at the expense of self-expression. They explore this idea in the former 
communist nations and argue that the economic and social dislocations in the aftermath of 
the fall of communism had precisely this effect. Given that support for democracy is 
correlated with self-expression, we can hypothesize that it too will be negatively affected by 
national level experiences which create insecurity. 
Hypothesis: Greater levels of political instability and turmoil will be associated with reduced 
support for democracy among the college educated and the rich.
In addition, many Muslim-majority countries have experienced such instability and 
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turmoil, making it possible that the diminished effect of education in MMCs can be linked to 
national level effects. This would be an alternative to an Islamic culture argument that would 
suggest that individuals have absorbed some pan-Islamic heritage which orients them against 
democracy through residence in a Muslim-majority country. The next section makes clear 
that any such view is based on a reading of Islam which does not take into account the survey 
data and resultant literature on support for democracy in MMCs.  
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Chapter 3. What do Muslims think about Democracy?
The specialist literature on the Middle East has noted similar tendencies among the 
wealthy and educated. Sivan (2003) says that “radical Islam has the effect of making the soft 
conservative-liberal center embrace authoritarian regimes for fear of the alternative.” Bellin 
(2000) describes capitalists as contingent democrats – with the contingency being the 
safeguarding of their own profits. The idea of political turmoil driving would-be democrats 
into the arms of authoritarian regimes suggests a refinement to modernization theory which 
highlights the importance of experience and social context (such as political turmoil) in 
shaping individuals views. 
Waterbury's (1994) influential argument described the Middle East as an 
“environment singularly inhospitable to legal pluralism and democracy” on a reading of its 
political economy rather than it being exceptional in any essentially cultural way. The idea of 
Muslims being undemocratic in an essentialist way is an old, old canard that many have tried 
to put to rest (see, for example, Hudson (1995) with specific reference to Arab political 
culture and Wedeen (2002) for a more programmatic statement on political culture in 
political science). Nonetheless, orientalist essentialisms still crop up, such as in Lipset's 
(1994) address to the American Sociological Association in 1993 where he argues that 
political freedom is alien to Islam, that the Islamic state is in principle a theocracy, and that 
the prospects for democracy in Muslim states are poor. Prior literature using WVS data has 
addressed overall Muslim attitudes to democracy extensively, with the purported “clash of 
civilizations” a regular target.  Pippa Norris and Ron Inglehart (2004) show that Muslims 
hold political attitudes (on democratic performance and ideals, as well as of strong, less 
democratic leaders) of “minimal difference” to those held by people in Western countries. 
There is more support for religious authority in public life in MMCs, but Catholic countries 
in Latin America as well as nations in sub-Saharan Africa share that preference. If there is a 
civilizational difference to be found it is not in political values but in social ones. The 
greatest difference found by Inglehart and Norris concerned gender equality and sexual 
liberalization. They suggest that younger generations in the West have become more liberal 
while those in Muslim countries have retained traditional sexual mores. Esmer (2002) 
produces similar findings to Norris and Inglehart from WVS data, adding that the Protestant 
work ethic is present in MMCs as well. Further, Esmer finds no difference in attitudes 
towards democratic culture between Muslims and non-Muslims in eight countries with 
sizable Muslim minorities. 
The basic finding that Muslims express strong support for democracy has also been 
confirmed from data sources other than the WVS. The Pew Global Attitudes Project has 
several reports (2003, 2006) in which the majority of respondents in MMCs agree with the 
statement that democracy “...is not just for the West and can work well here.” Moataz Fattah 
(2006) finds majority support for democratic norms and institutions in most MMCs that he 
considers consistent with Norris and Inglehart (2002)6. 
Mark Tessler (2003) has used survey data from Morocco and Algeria to investigate 
6 One important discrepancy is that Fattah's sample is entirely urban, literate, and non-poor. It also includes 
surveys administered by email as well as face-to-face. The choice of sample and lack of clarity between his 
survey questions and categories for analysis make direct comparisons with the WVS difficult. 
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whether "the religious or cultural traditions that predominate in most Arab countries inhibit 
the emergence of a democratic political culture." Tessler considers dimensions of personal 
piety and views on the role of Islamic guidance in public affairs against attitudes towards 
democracy and political participation, finding nothing to suggest that “the Islamic 
attachments of Arab men and women” discouraged “a democratic, civic and participant 
political culture.” The only statistically significant relationships Tessler finds in the opposite 
direction are among women who desire Islamic guidance in economic and commercial 
affairs, suggesting that the motivation is based on a focus on economic concerns rather than 
the religious. Education too plays a role, as education is associated with increased support for 
democracy among men but has the opposite relationship for women. Tessler doesn't explore 
this point as the focus of the analysis is on religiosity.
The relationship between socio-economic characteristics of respondents and their 
support for democracy is unclear. Grant and Tessler (2002) found some support7 for a 
respondent profile associated with increased support for democracy in Palestine. Having had 
some higher education, being male, older, wealthy and in an urban area were all associated 
with increased support for democracy – although it should also be noted that people outside 
that profile don't necessarily oppose democracy. Respondents also occasionally combined 
support for political Islam8 with support for democracy. However, Tessler and Gao (2005) 
7 This relationship between membership in favored social categories and increased support for democracy was 
found in only half of their regression results. 
8 Support for political Islam is measured as a composite of three questions asking about a political role for 
religious leaders, whether religion should be separate from politics, and support for a political system based 
on Islamic law. 
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did not find any variation in support for democracy across age, gender, and education in six 
Arab countries surveyed between 2000 and 2004 despite expecting to do so. On the other 
hand, Fattah (2006) does find that higher education levels are associated with  increased 
support for democratic norms (in terms of minority electoral participation), although it has 
the opposite association in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Fattah suggests that the pro-regime 
content of the Saudi curriculum is to blame, while in the UAE the negative relationship 
between education and democratic norms disappears when controlling for age. Fattah also 
finds education to be positively associated with a scale which taps questions on whether 
voting, elected rulers, and “democratic norms and institutions” are not anti-Islamic9. For six 
of the countries in Fattah's dataset there is a negative association between income and this 
second scale, while there is a positive association for eight countries. Fattah can link most of 
the negative associations to oil-rich rentier states in Arabian Gulf area, but the countries with 
positive associations are highly heterogeneous and no simple explanation is present. One of 
the advantages of this study will be the ability to tackle such problems in more detail by 
combining individual attitudes with national level data on political and economic conditions 
as well as state type in a systematic fashion. In Faithlines, Hassan Riaz (2002) finds that 
education is associated with increased trust in state institutions, but his data does not include 
a question on support for democracy. Given that Riaz's four states (Egypt, Indonesia, 
Kazakhstan, and Pakistan) are not entirely democratic, one can speculate as to how education 
shapes attitudes towards the state vis-à-vis democracy. Although findings have been mixed, 
9 Fattah describes this scale as capturing “support for democratic institutions,” but because each question 
specifically frames democratic institutions with respect to religious principles I have presented it in those 
terms. 
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most of the evidence suggests that higher education levels are associated with increased 
support for democracy. 
The overall view of Muslim attitudes to democracy present in the literature is one of 
overwhelming and consistent support for democracy. There are some findings of an 
association between educated and wealthy individuals and an increased support for 
democracy, but these are not consistent. However, the comparative work on socio-economic 
variations in support for democracy has been limited in scope to a few countries at a time and 
has not yet been a focus of any studies. The combination of socio-economic characteristics of 
respondents with national level contextual information in this study will be a new 
contribution to the study of attitudes to democracy in MMCs.  
This study delves more deeply into the idea of a socio-economic profile associated with 
increased support for democracy and explores how the attitudes of high education and 
income individuals vary from that profile in relation to their national contexts. 
Hypothesis: College educated and rich individuals will be no less supportive of democracy 
in MMCs than they are elsewhere
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Chapter 4. Data
Table 2a: Descriptive Statistics for Level 1 Variables (Individuals)
Variable N Mean St. Dev. Min. Max
Prodem 73731 1.76 0.75 1 4
College 73731 0.22 0.41 0 1
Rich 73731 0.32 0.47 0 1
Age 73731 3.13 1.56 1 6
Female 73731 0.50 0.50 0 1
Table 2b: Descriptive Statistics for Level 2 Variables (Countries)
Variable N Mean St. Dev. Min. Max
MMC 64 0.16 0.37 0 1
Polity 64 6.16 5.35         -7.00 10.00
Gini10 64 3.63 0.91 2.47 5.93
PPP11 64 8.99 1.03 6.25 10.43
Political 
Change
64 0.97 1.55 0 7.00
Political 
Terror Scale
64 2.29 1.09 1 5
        The main source of data for this study is the Fourth Wave of the WVS conducted from 
1999-2001. 63 countries provided the 72277 respondent interviews used for this study. 
Respondents missing responses to any of the questions of interest were deleted from the 
10 Although Gini is usually measured on a scale from 0-100, I have transformed it by dividing by 10 so as to 
keep the range of values closer in magnitude to the other variables.
11 I normalize the PPP variable using a natural log transformation. 
sample. The total list of countries in the sample is included for reference in Appendix A12. 
        Prodem is the dependent variable of this analysis and represents the question 
“Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government” asked in 
the World Values survey. Possible answers were Agree Strongly, Agree, Disagree, and 
Strongly Disagree. A score of 4 for Prodem indicates a response of Strongly Disagree.13  The 
low mean score demonstrates broad support for democracy across the world.
The College variable is taken from the WVS and takes values of either 0 or 1, with a 
score of 1 indicating that the individual has had at least some college education. Individuals 
with higher education levels are hypothesized to be more pro-democracy. 
The Rich variable is also taken from the WVS and is similarly coded, with a score of 
1 representing the highest of three income categories in the WVS. The WVS income scores 
are relative to the country, and scores of 1 in different countries do not reflect absolute 
income levels but the highest tertile group in that country.14 Individuals with higher income 
levels are hypothesized to be more pro-democracy than those with lower income levels. It is 
also worth noting the highest tertile group represents relative wealth, but cannot be thought 
of as an elite group as it is simply too broad. 
12 Every country and observation that could be included – i.e. for which there was data – was included. The 
only exclusions were based on a lack of available data.
13 I maintain this coding because the HLM software uses the highest category of an ordinal dependent 
variable as the reference category. Thus, regression coefficients and resulting odds ratios can be 
interpreted with respect to support for the question on democracy, i.e. positive coefficients meaning a 
greater likelihood of support for democracy. 
14 The WVS doesn't give details on how country specific incomes were recoded, only that they were separated 
into higher middle and lower tiers of income. 
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Age and female are two control variables taken from WVS questions with no 
associated hypotheses. Age has six categories of ten year increments from 15-24 to the final 
category of 65-98. 
The variable MMC denotes Muslim-majority country, and indicates whether a 
country has a percentage Muslim population of 50% or more.15 The source for this data is the 
World Christian Database.16 A negative relationship between Muslim-majority countries and 
having pro-democracy attitudes would provide some support for those who suggest that 
Muslims are inherently and essentially predisposed against democracy because of the 
example of the historical community founded by the Prophet Muhammad. 
The Polity score ranges from -10 (autocratic regimes) to +10 (liberal democracies) 
and is taken from the Polity IV project.17 It is constructed from a series of indicators which 
capture the extent to which the executive branch is competitively elected, the presence of 
checks and balances between the branches of government, and that public participation in 
political life is possible. 
15 Coding for Muslims on an individual basis is problematic because the most relevant WVS question has 
inconsistent response options across countries requiring imputation for almost all respondents in Algeria, 
Morocco, and Pakistan. For Morocco and Algeria this results in near-perfect collinearity with MMC and 
causes convergence problems for the HLM software. 
16 Published by the Center for the Study of Global Christianity at Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary in 
2004. Available at http://www.worldchristiandatabase.org/wcd 
17  Monty Marshall and Keith Jaggers, Polity IV Project: Dataset Users Manual
     http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/  
While Polity represents in many ways the best “democracy score” available, there are issues with judge-
specific bias which  affect subjective measures of liberal democracy (Bollen 1991, Bollen and Paxton 2000). 
Unfortunately, no review of judge-specific bias has yet been done for the Polity ratings of democracy.
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PPP is a measure of per capita national income for the year 2000 in thousands of US$ 
using purchasing power parity taken from the World Development Indicators published by 
the World Bank.18 Purchasing power parity is an adjustment of national income based on the 
cost of living in a specific country. 
Gini is a country's Gini coefficient19, a measure of national income inequality where 0 
represents perfect inequality and 1 represents perfect equality, although I have rescaled it to 
range from 0-10 in order to keep it in line with the absolute values of other variables. The 
Gini coefficient is calculated as twice the area between the Lorenz curve (which charts 
cumulative income by percentile) and the 45° line of prefect income equality (Malinovic 
2005). Due to the data demands of calculating Gini coefficients, they are typically not 
produced in every year. I have used the 2000 value where available, or the most recent prior 
value (after 1993) that is available. The World Bank (2006) uses surveys from as far back as 
1993 in presenting Gini coefficients in its 2006 publication of national indicators. As Gini 
coefficients do not tend to exhibit strong fluctuations, this compromise should have limited 
impact on the validity of the indicator. In unequal countries, the potential exists that 
privileged individuals may take a view towards democracy that reflects their wish to 
perpetuate their own positions (Bourdieu 1977), which would be contrary to the effects 
suggested by modernization theory. 
Political Change is the standard deviation of a country’s Polity score in the period 
18 The World Development Indicators are available online at http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/ 
19 Taken from the World Development Indicators online at http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/. India's 
gini coefficient was added from the World Bank's (2006:280) World Development Report as this data point 
is missing from the online dataset. 
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1990-1999. Approximately half the countries in our sample saw no change in this period and 
thus have a score of 0. Former Soviet bloc countries have the very highest scores for this 
variable, but Muslim majority countries also have higher mean scores. The hypothesis is that 
individuals who have experienced recent political turmoil and upheaval may temper their 
democratic idealism with a desire for short-term stability. The Polity IV dataset contains a 
variable on the durability of regimes which is intended to capture “a substantive, normative 
change in political authority considered sufficient to present greater opportunities for regime 
opponents to challenge the non-institutionalized authority of the polity,” and it does so by 
marking a break in regime as a 3 point shift in Polity score within a three year period 
(Marshall and Jaggers (2005:29)). Their formulation sets a higher threshold for registering 
change than mine, and I use the standard deviation of a country's Polity score so as to capture 
less grand but still important sources of instability which may influence attitudes.
The Political Terror Scale is a measure of state oppression derived from US State 
Department and Amnesty International reports on human rights abuses in countries. Yearly 
country reports are coded on a scale of 1-5 ranging from a score of 1 being “countries under a 
secure rule of law” to 5 being “The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or 
thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals” (Gibney and Dalton 
1996). The Political Terror Scale is a 5 year average of countries scores from 1995 to 1999. 
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Table 3: Summary of Hypothesized Effects
Level 1 
Variables  
(individual)
Level 2 Variables (country)
MMC Polity PPP Gini Political 
Change
Political 
Terror 
Scale
College 0 + + - - -
Rich 0 + + - - -
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Chapter 5. Models and Analysis
I use a two level ordinal logistic model to analyze how support for democracy varies 
in different social situations and by individual income and education. The use of a multilevel 
model is appropriate because of its ability to capture unobserved country level effects while 
combining national level indicators with individual level ones (Steenbergen and Jones 
(2002). Others have used multilevel models with WVS data specifically to capture the effects 
of individual and country level factors (Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas (2001)) as well as 
to capture cross-level interaction effects (Ruiter and de Graaf (2006)). A linear model would 
be inappropriate because it could predict nonsensical values beyond the range of the 
dependent variable. An ordinal model reflects the ordering of the four categories in the 
dependent variable from strongly disagree to strongly agree, and requires a cumulative logit 
construction. The regression equation for model 3 is described below:
P'(1) = prob(prodem=1|B) = P(1)
P'(2) = prob(prodem<=2|B) = P(1) + (P2)
P'(3) = prob(prodem<=3|B) = P(1) + P(2) + P(3)
P'(4) = prob(prodem<=3|B) = P(1) + P(2) + P(3) + P(4) = 1
Level 1  20  
log (P'(1)/(1-P'(1))= β0 + β1 College + β2  Rich  + β3  Age + β4 Female
log (P'(2)/(1-P'(2))= β0 + β1 College + β2  Rich  + β3  Age + β4 Female + δ2
20 The age variable is centered at the mean of each country so that the intercept is interpretable.
log (P'(3)/(1-P'(3))= β0 + β1 College + β2  Rich  + β3  Age + β4 Female + δ3
Level 2  21  
β0 = γ00 + γ01MMC + γ02Polity + γ03PPP + γ04Gini + γ05Political Change + γ06Political Terror 
Scale + u0
β1 = γ10 + γ11MMC + γ12Polity + γ13PPP + γ14Gini + γ15Political Change + γ16Political Terror 
Scale + u1
β2 = γ20 + γ21MMC + γ22Polity + γ23PPP + γ24Gini + γ25Political Change + γ26Political Terror 
Scale + u2
β3 = γ30 +  u3
β4 = γ40 + u4
The regression equation for model 1 has none of the γ terms beyond γk0, while model 2 
includes γk0 as well as γk1 terms (where k takes values from 0 to 4). 
21 All the level 2 variables except MMC and Political Change are centered at the grand mean of all the 
countries in the sample. 
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Table 4: Regression Results for Multilevel Ordinal Logistic Model of Support for 
Democracy
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
For Intercept slope, β0
Intercept, γ00 -0.56 *** -0.63 *** -0.55 ***
MMC, γ01 0.39 0.57
Polity, γ02 -0.02
PPP, γ03 0.16
Gini, γ04 0.08
Political Change, γ05 -0.11 +
Political Terror Scale, γ06 -0.02
 For  College slope, β1
Intercept, γ10 0.46 *** 0.50 *** 0.45 ***
MMC, γ11 -0.21 ** -0.10
Polity, γ12 0.02 *
PPP, γ13 0.09 *
Gini, γ14 -0.09 +
Political Change, γ15 0.02
Political Terror Scale, γ16 0.05
For Rich slope, β2
Intercept, γ20 0.19 *** 0.23 *** 0.26 ***
MMC, γ21 -0.23 * -0.16 +
Polity, γ22 0.00
PPP, γ23 -0.06
Gini, γ24 -0.08 *
Political Change, γ25 -0.05 *
Political Terror Scale, γ26 -0.04
 For Age slope, β3
Intercept, γ30 0.07 *** 0.07 *** 0.07 ***
 For Female slope, β4
Intercept, γ40 -0.14 *** -0.14 *** -0.14 ***
Variance Components
Intercept, u0 0.72 *** 0.72 *** 0.70 ***
College slope, u1 0.26 *** 0.25 *** 0.23 ***
Rich slope, u2 0.21 *** 0.19 *** 0.18 ***
Age slope, u3 0.09 *** 0.09 *** 0.09 ***
Female slope, u4 0.15 *** 0.15 *** 0.15 ***
Note: + denotes statistical significance at the p=0.10 level, * at the 0.05 level, ** at the 0.01 level, and *** at the 0.001 
level
All models were estimated using Restricted Maximum Likelihood estimation 
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techniques with the software HLM v6.01. The β coefficients in table 4, which are functions 
of the γ coefficients, tell us how a one unit increase in a given independent variable changes 
the log odds of an individual being in a higher category of support for democracy (e.g. 
Disagree rather than Strongly Disagree). In model 1, the odds of a college educated 
individual expressing stronger support for a democracy than someone with less than a college 
education are 58% (exp[0.46]-1). In model 2 this same relationship is now contingent on 
MMC, as β1 = γ11 + γ11MMC. In model 2 we see that the odds of a college educated 
individual expressing stronger support for a democracy than someone with less than a college 
education are 34% (exp[0.5-0.21*1]-1) in an MMC versus 65% (exp[0.5]-1) in a non-MMC. 
In model 3 this relationship is yet more complex as the value of β1 is now contingent on all 
the other level 2 variables as well, which take different values in each country. However, the 
interpretation of these models which is most relevant to this paper is in the interactions of 
college education with the different aspects of national context and the question of whether 
MMC remains a significant factor once other country level factors are included. 
Model 1 establishes the basic finding that college educated and rich individuals are 
more likely to express stronger support for democracy (i.e. γ10 and γ20 are statistically 
significant and positive) than individuals who are poor and have less than a college 
education. Further, the statistical significance of the variance component terms u1 and u2 
show that these relationships vary significantly across countries. Model 2 shows that MMC 
has statistically significant negative interactions with College and Rich, suggesting that the 
pro-democracy effects of college education and higher income are reduced in MMCs. In 
MMCs, a college educated individual is still more likely to express greater support for 
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democracy, but less so than such individuals in non-MMCs. Figure 1 had also shown this 
trend, with all ten MMCs on the left of the graph although the mean difference in support for 
democracy was negative for four of the ten. 
Model 3  is intended as a challenge to the finding of model 2: that something intrinsic 
to MMCs  (possibly a pan-Islamic anti-democratic ideology) reduces the pro-democracy 
effects of higher education. Model 3 does allow us to dismiss that finding, as MMC is no 
longer statistically significant,  and replace it with a combination of factors which includes 
the level of democracy, national income, and income inequality (the first two have 
statistically significant interaction effects with college while that of income inequality is of 
borderline significance at p=0.051). The likelihood that a college educated individual will 
express greater support for democracy increases in more democratic countries and in richer 
countries, but decreases in the presence of income inequality. That these factors describing 
the national context are statistically significant in model 3, while MMC is no longer 
statistically significant, suggest that they represent a better explanation of how college 
education is related to support for democracy in MMCs than anything unique to MMCs. 
The findings for the interaction of national level characteristics with individual 
income are similar but different to those of college education. In model 3, the interaction of 
MMC with Rich (γ21) is reduced in absolute size and significance, but remains marginally 
significant at the p=0.09 level. While national income and level of democracy do not have 
significant interactions with Rich, income inequality does. In more unequal countries, rich 
individuals are less likely to be more supportive of democracy than in egalitarian countries. 
Also, recent political change has a negative effect on support for democracy among the rich. 
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The results for interactions with Rich in model 3 are intriguing because MMC has not been 
completely eliminated in terms of its negative association, but the arguments about anti-
democratic tendencies in Islam operate through ideology and not individual prosperity. There 
is no theoretically grounded reason why Islam should make the rich less supportive of 
democracy. Bellin's  label of the bourgeoisie as contingent democrats is closest to the bill, but 
that idea is more to do with political instability. Political instability is easy to conceive of as 
detrimental to economic growth, and would thus be counter to the interests of the rich as they 
are most sensitive to the investment environment. Lessened support for democracy could 
thus be understood as a willingness to tolerate authoritarian tactics in exchange for a stable 
political environment which is more conducive to business interests. 
Taken as a whole, the final model supports the idea that the “effect” of MMC is in 
fact better represented by a fuller portrayal of a country's economic and political context. 
MMC, statistically significant in model 2, is no longer as influential in model 3. 
29
Chapter 6. Conclusion
The main finding from this paper is first to confirm that education increases support 
for democracy less in MMCs than elsewhere. Sivan (2003) and Bellin (2000) appear to have 
a point in suggesting that otherwise pro-democracy constituencies are less supportive of 
democracy in MMCs than we might expect. However, this finding is the result of national 
level contexts which include relatively lower levels of economic development, lower levels 
of democracy, and income inequality, rather than any overarching Islamic factor linking the 
MMCs in this sample. A secondary finding is that rich individuals – also a pro-democracy 
constituency according to modernization theory – decrease their support for democracy in 
countries with higher levels of income inequality and political instability. 
Income inequality has negative interactions with both college education and 
individual income. High levels of income inequality suggests the potential for more class 
conflict and polarization in the population. However, rather than polarization inhibiting 
democracy, Luebbert (1991) suggests that it is the failure of democrats which leads to 
polarization. This dataset cannot investigate the sequential and causal aspect of that 
statement, but the findings in model 3 do confirm a reduced support for democracy in 
unequal environments where there is greater potential for class polarization. The finding on 
inequality also gives support to the idea that where class differences are strongest, the 
privileged will be less supportive of democracy. 
By including national level and individual level information in the models I have 
sought to explore the main democratizing mechanism posited by modernization theory. I find 
that college educated and rich individuals become less supportive of democracy in national 
contexts where class differences are strong, the polity is unstable or less democratic, and the 
country is poorer. Further, the superficial finding that educated and rich individuals are less 
supportive of democracy in MMCs is shown to be an artifact of national contexts rather than 
driven by anything intrinsic to Islam.
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Appendix A: List of 64 Countries Included in the Analysis
Albania Japan
Algeria Jordan
Argentina Korea, Republic of
Armenia Latvia
Australia Lithuania
Austria
Macedonia, The Former Yugoslavian 
Republic of
Azerbaijan Mexico
Bangladesh Moldova
Belarus Morocco
Belgium Netherlands
Brazil New Zealand
Bulgaria Nigeria
Canada Pakistan
Chile Philippines
China, People's Republic of Poland
Croatia Romania
Czech Republic Russia
Denmark Slovak Republic
Dominican Republic Slovenia
Egypt South Africa
Estonia Spain
Finland Sweden
France Switzerland
Georgia Tanzania
Germany Turkey
Greece Uganda
Hungary Ukraine
India United Kingdom
Indonesia United States of America
Iran Uruguay
Ireland Venezuela
Italy Zimbabwe
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